



CUI



RFA 48

MRF ISO Federal Agency

Camarillo AAR

19 July 24

Suspense for Input: 1400 PDT 19 JULY 25



CUI

Roll Call



G1

G2

G4

G6

Protection

SJA

OSURG

PAO

RGN 9

49 MP BDE

G3

Deputy CoS

CoS

CDR



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Areas for Discussion

Notification / Receipt of Mission: Planning, meetings, actions, structure, coordination leading up to mission execution.

Set-up / Preparation: The aerial/map recon, physical set-up, Comms, training prep, pre-execution actions, and movement to the objective.

Execution: Actions on the objective. Integration efforts with federal agency. Detainee operations.
Legal ramifications.

Post Actions On: Egress of detainees. Installation support.



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Notification / Receipt of Mission: Planning, meetings, actions, structure, coordination leading up to mission execution.



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49th MP BDE



- **Observation:** The initial request for DoD support for this large-scale mission was cancelled. Unfortunately, this led to the federal agencies having no local DoD support IVO Ventura County, this resulted in MRF units assigned to RFA 38 AOR responding.
- **Discussion:** Subordinate units made immediate adaptations throughout the mission and were receptive to change as the event developed.
- **Recommendation:** Provide the BN CDR with a solid POC on the ground and a daily snapshot of operations within the AO to put appropriate MRFs on alert for possible response. This will decrease the response time and have our forces better postured and allow for map recon to plan primary and alternate routes.
- **Alibi:**
- **POC:** (b) (6)
- **Rec OPR:**



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IACP



- **Observation:** 48hrs prior to RFA 48's execution date, DHS/CBP canceled DoD direct Support to RFA 48. Furthermore, DHS/CBP still had expectation(s) of DoD support when needed. Moreover, there was little to no formal operational updates to senior DoD LNO prior to actions on OBJ.
- **Discussion:** How can DoD remain tied into planning / and execution of DHS operations while not impeding investigations and DHS's operation(s) integrity?
- **Recommendation(s):**
 - NLT 3hrs. Prior to actions of the OBJ, DHS should provide operational updates to the senior DoD LNO for SA in the event an immediate response is needed.
 - DHS and DoD agree to a ATAK / COP federation MoU IOT battle track agents and Service members in the field.
 - **Alibi:** There is precedence of ATAK / COP federation MoU (JTF-NCR, JTF-SB, JTF-North, JIATF-South); COP integration does and will increase operation efficiency
 - **POC:** (b) (6)
 - **Rec OPR:** TF-51/ARNORTH Protection / ANORTH G6 (WRT ATAK COP Integration)



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Region IX



- **Observation:** RFA was cancelled by the lead federal agency prior to receipt of mission, leading to lack of deliberate planning for BSI support.
- **Discussion:** The RFA was cancelled and then executed by the LFA. Upon deployment of the MRFs, the Emergency Manager for Naval Base Ventura County (NVBC) activated the base Emergency Operations Center to coordinate resources for this RFA. The embedded EPLO facilitated communications between TF51 and NBVC. Naval
- **Recommendation:** When planning large scale immigration enforcement that will likely require base support, provide as much advance warning as possible.
- **POC:** (b) (6)
- **OPR:** (b) (6)



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Set-up / Preparation: The aerial/map recon, physical set-up, Comms, training prep, pre-execution actions, and movement to the objective.



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49th MP BDE



- **Observation:** Coordination resulted in units responding without an in-brief and no information on staging, routes, ingress, egress, and supporting medical facilities in the AO.
- **Discussion:** This caused issues on the ground both ingress and egress as crowds blocked our routes. In addition, most agents were not tracking the plan or did not have a plan when it came to moving detainees.
- **Recommendation:** Establish Multiagency Coordination System and have one singular command post on ground during joint missions. Establish a formal radio communications plan.
- **Alibi:**
- **POC:** (b) (6)
- **Rec OPR:**



CUI

IACP



- **Observation:** Usage of BDE/BN embedded LNOs with respective inter-agencies was not optimized appropriately
- **Discussion:** How can C2 / synchronization of BDE/BNs embedded internal LNOs with respective agencies be optimized in more efficient and effective manner?
- **Recommendation:** Establish a formal C2 structure for all embedded LNOs with inter-agencies IOT streamline communication and optimize DoD response / themes and message - narratives / limitation and constraints at echelon.
- **Alibi:** embedded LNO at the tactical level with CBP had better SA of the planning / movement phase and was critical in the DoD response.
- **POC:** (b) (6)
- **Rec OPR:** DoD Senior LNO, TF-51 G3 / CoS,



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Execution: Actions on the objective.
Integration efforts with federal agency.
Detainee operations.
Legal ramifications.



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49th MP BDE



- **Observation:** During the operation, our freedom of movement was hindered by civilian vehicles in our formation. This left vehicles vulnerable to protestors who eventually climbed on vehicles and threw items at our Soldiers. The protocol for moving unoccupied vehicles was unclear and requests for clarification were not immediately answered. Agents were not there to receive the units as they arrived, resulting in vehicles getting blocked by civilian vehicles.
- **Discussion:** The lack of prior coordination for this large-scale mission created an unnecessary delay in responding
- **Recommendation:** A mission of this scale should have been planned out with DoD for support to work through those potential issues and have a better plan in place for transporting detainees off the objective. Pre-coordinate for the federal agency to receive the unit via a clear route / block a path for the unit to arrive and integrate into operations. Amend RUF to clarify when we can move vacant vehicles and to authorize LRADs on lead vehicles.
- **Alibi:**
- **POC:** (b) (6)
- **Rec OPR:**

NORTHCOM's Theater Army

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IACP



- **Observation:** IACP posture / set up was not the ideal for tactical C2 of the Operation / battle tracking (ATAK/UAS feed/Tactical Radio Communication) was/is limited.
- **Discussion:** How can DoD increase inter-agency operability and enhance battle tracking of operations in real time
- **Recommendation:** Increase tactical radio communication and battle tracking among the enterprise via ATAK Federation MoU and investing in hasty tactical Radio communication capabilities IOT enhance senior leader(s) situational awareness at the IACP.
- **Alibi:** embedded LNO at the tactical level with CBP was better postured as at the tactical level command post was better suited for operational updates.
- **POC:** (b) (6)
- **Rec OPR:** DoD Senior LNO, TF-51 G3 / CoS.



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Post Actions On: Egress of detainees. **Installation support.**



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49th MP BDE



- **Observation:** The lead agent on ground was tracking there was approval for DoD personnel to transport detainees in military vehicles. That information had to be deconflicted on the ground, taking additional time to get the detainees transported out of the area. Ingress and egress routes were not identified, leading to vehicles being blocked in by protestor vehicles. Naval Police did not have the capability to receive us at the same time as the arrival of the Federal Agents, resulting in unnecessary moves and confusion. The lack of follow up coordination led to a delay in rest cycle for our Soldiers.
- **Discussion:** The lack of prior coordination for this large-scale mission created an unnecessary delay in responding as well as evacuating the detainees, further escalating the situation on the ground.
- **Recommendation:** A mission of this scale should have been planned out with DoD for support to work through those potential issues and have a better plan in place for transporting detainees off the objective. Identify primary and alternate ingress/egress routes. Rather than having the watch commander escort us to billeting, we could have gone straight there and had our units already on ground initiate billeting requirements rather than waiting until after 0200 to coordinate. Assign an LNO from TF51 at each BSI location for final coordination.
- **Alibi:**
- **POC:** (b) (6) [REDACTED]
- **Rec OPR:**



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IACP



- **Observation:** No legal representation at the IACP.
- **Discussion:** How can DoD increase operational effectiveness when hasty emergency requirements / Request for Support – information peculate at the IACP level?
- **Recommendation:** Increase inter-agency operation updates with the DoD Senior LNO, and increase legal representation at the IACP when known / large operations are occurring.
- **Alibi:** Enhance Inter-agency pre-coordination. Legal inquires were addressed but enhance of information flow might increase speed to need with a DoD legal rep. embedded with the IACP during significant operations.
- **POC:** (b) (6)
- **Rec OPR:** DoD Senior LNO, TF-51 G3 / CoS.



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RGN IX



- **Observation:** In addition to 49th MP personnel, Naval Base Ventura County (NBVC) was supporting unanticipated requirements adding to demand on base resources.
- **Discussion:** In addition to 207 Soldiers, NBVC provided emergency support for 500 HSI and CBP personnel, 270 detainees, and activated security forces against possible protests and prepared NBVC leadership for possible media engagement. These additional requirements strained resources and personnel.
- **Recommendation:** Lead Federal Agency should provide advanced details on scope and nature of the operation and BSI support should anticipate similar needs for large operations moving forward.
- **POC:** (b) (6)
- **OPR:** (b) (6)



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RGN IX



- **Observation:** Naval Base Ventura County (NBVC) is responsible for funding of BSI support (meals, fuel, lodging) and suffers a financial loss when providing unbudgeted services. Eventually, budget constraints may affect the level of services provided.
- **Discussion:** NBVC will likely continue to be used as a BSI for future immigration operations. Additionally, the location make it a possible candidate for positioning a TF51 Mobile Response Force for future mission protection support.
- **Recommendation:** Explore possibility of contractual agreement, or transfer of funds, to NBVC to ensure necessary support can be provided to TF51 and the lead federal agency.
- **POC:** (b) (6)
- **OPR:** (b) (6)



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RGN IX



- **Observation:** RIX EPLO was positioned at Naval Base Ventura County (NBVC) but communications between the operational unit and base personnel were indirect and led to confusion.
- **Discussion:** RIX EPLO was on site at NBVC and was able to work with the Emergency Manager to coordinate support for the unit. However, communications between the operational unit and base personnel were relayed through TF51.
- **Recommendation:** Establish direct communications between operational unit commander and appropriate base POC for BSI coordination and support.
- **Alibi:** N/A
- **POC:** (b) (6) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
- **OPR:** (b) (6) [REDACTED]



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RGN IX



- **Observation:** Naval Base Ventura County (NBVC) is the most suitable title 10 facility for BSI/Staging area support for immigration enforcement activities by the lead federal agency. NBVC is an Active-Duty base with limitations on resources and billeting.
- **Discussion:** 79 rooms were vacant to support personnel for this mission. In addition, the installation provided boxed meals for the Soldiers. Without a contractual agreement, the number of rooms and Class I support will fluctuate. NBVC has a surplus of staging areas/parking spaces.
- **Recommendation:** Operational units travel with cots/bedding and sustainment (MREs/Water) for possibility of overnight stays.
- **POC:** (b) (6)
- **OPR:** (b) (6)



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RGN IX



- **Observation:** Individuals opposed to the immigration operations entered the outer perimeter of Naval Base Ventura County and refuse to leave (subsequently detained and handed over to ICE).
- **Discussion:** Conducting the Federal Protection Mission adds additional security concerns on BSIs. This is especially true for Bell Army Reserve Base and Upland Army Reserve Center, neither of which have any security forces and located in a highly urban area of LA. All BSI facilities supporting this mission are likely to experience protesters, attempts to enter the facilities, vandalism, and possible harassment of permanently stationed personnel.
- **Recommendation:** Recommend TF51 conduct a risk to the BSI assessment as part of mission planning to include base security force augmentation as appropriate.
- **POC:** (b) (6)
- **OPR:** (b) (6)



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Alibis & Closing Comments

- ☐ OUT Stations
- ☐ AROUND THE ROOM
- ☐ G3
- ☐ Deputy Chief of Staff
- ☐ Chief of Staff
- ☐ TF-51 Commander, (b) (6)